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Giving in South Africa:  Determining the influence of altruism, inequality 





I use data from the South African Social Giving Survey to investigate the role of social capital 
and motivations for giving to formal charities and beggars. Results suggest that both impure 
altruism and inequality aversion positively influence giving to formal charities but they have no 
influence on giving to beggars. The role of social capital is varied. Members of informal 
insurance groups are more likely to give to both charities and beggars, while members of formal 
community groups are more likely to give to charities only. Members of interest groups are 
actually less likely to donate to charities and prefer giving to beggars.   
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The literature on the economics of charitable giving is dominated by studies from the developed 
world. Moreover, household surveys containing comprehensive data on charitable giving are rare 
in developing regions like sub-Saharan Africa. This study addresses this knowledge gap in 
economic literature by utilizing data from the only survey on giving in South Africa.  
 
I determine “why” people give by investigating whether impure altruism (warm glow) and 
inequality aversion are motives of charitable giving in a diverse country like South Africa. 
Individuals driven by impure altruism receive utility or experience a “warm glow” from the act 
of giving (Andreoni, 1990), unlike pure altruism where the main interest is in the welfare of 
recipients (Roberts, 1984). Studies by Derin-Güre and Uler (2010) and Yamamura (2012) have 
demonstrated that inequality aversion motivates charitable giving in US and Japan. I also focus 
on social capital which is also another key determinant of giving (Brooks, 2005).  It is especially 
relevant to poor South African communities where giving has a collective character (Habib et al., 
2008). Social capital is measured by associational membership (Putnam, 2000), classified into 
three categories; formal community groups, formal interest/political groups and informal 
insurance groups (prevalent in African settings and intended for risk-pooling rather than civic 
engagement). 
 
To help understand “why” people give, I compare giving to formal charities and beggars. 
Beggars are a recognized recipient of charitable giving in South Africa (Everatt et al., 2005). 
This comparison is one way of looking at “to whom and when” people are altruistic. Formal 
charities, unlike beggars, are intermediaries and formal structures. Furthermore, beggars may be 
3 
 
viewed as deviants, lazy or undeserving recipients such that giving is construed as a perverse 
incentive that encourages dependency on charity (Lee and Farell, 2003).  Formal charities and 
beggars could also present different contexts for altruism. Unlike formal charities, beggars 
mostly receive small donations and mostly use face to face verbal solicitation; hence it is 
plausible that negative audience effects and avoidance (driven by social pressure) could 
dominate and thus suppress giving (Andreoni et al., 2011; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; 
DellaVigna et al., 2012). This study assumes that given the likely differences in context and 
public attitudes, giving to beggars might not be as utility enhancing or preferable as giving to 
formal charities.  
 
Giving denotes both cash and in kind donations and is evaluated at the extensive margin. The 
results suggest that both impure altruism and inequality aversion are significantly and positively 
associated with giving to formal charities but not to beggars. Social capital has varied influence. 
Members of informal insurance groups give to both charities and beggars at similar probabilities, 
unlike members of formal community groups who only give to formal charities. Interestingly, 
members of interest/political groups are less likely to give to charities, but are more likely to give 
to beggars.  
 
2. Data and estimation strategy 
Data from the South Africa Social Giving Survey (December 2003) are used. The survey is a 
nationally representative cross-sectional sample of 2996 respondents. All respondents are aged 




The following model is estimated: 
Givingi=β0+β1λi+β2δi+ β3Xi +εi 
 
where Givingi is a binary variable indicating the charitable giving by individual i. This is 
obtained from yes or no answers to questions asked separately about cash and in kind donations 
(food/clothes/goods) to charities and beggars (beggar/street child/someone asking for help). λi 
denotes impure altruism (WARMGLOW) and inequality aversion of individual (INEQUAL) i. 
The proxy for impure altruism is generated from responses to the statement “I give because it 
makes me feel better”. This statement reveals possible utility generated from giving. The proxy 
for inequality aversion is generated from responses to the statement “I give because I have more 
than I need”. This may indicate intent for redistribution and thus concerns about inequality. Each 
proxy has three response options; “1 (agree)”, “2 (neutral)” and “3 (disagree)”. 
 
δi is a set of variables that are proxies for social capital, denoted as a count of membership in 
formal interest groups (political, student and environmental organizations), informal insurance 
groups (savings groups/stokvels and burial societies) and formal community groups (civic/social 
movement, book club, cultural organization, community development committee, community 
policing association, residential association, rotary, women’s group and youth group).  Xi is a 
vector of characteristics such as race, gender, education level, household assets, household size, 
religious affiliation, type of residence (urban or rural, formal or informal dwelling), and regional 
dummies. Unfortunately the survey did not have information on marital status and household 




Separate probit estimations are carried out to compare giving to formal charities and to beggars. 
Sample characteristics are presented in table 1. 




Black   77.77 
Christians 84.04 
Motives  
Give to formal charities 64.25 
Give to beggars 62.75 
WARMGLOW 84.71 
INEQUAL 16.16 
Social capital (group membership)  
Formal community  31.07 
Informal insurance 46.83 
Interest/political 21.30 
Observations 2.996 
Source: South Africa Social Giving Survey (SASGS 2003) 
 
 
3. Empirical results 
The marginal effects (table 2) indicate that those who feel better from giving (impure altruism) 
the probability of giving to formal charities increases by 9 per cent compared to those who 
disagree. Individuals expressing inequality aversion (I have more than I need), are more likely to 
give to charities by 6 per cent compared to those who disagree. However, agreement with both 
these motives does not significantly influence giving to beggars, consistent with the assumption 
that giving to beggars might not be as utility enhancing or preferable as giving to charities. 
 
Concerning the role of social capital, a one unit increase in formal community group 
membership increases the probability of giving to formal charities by 5 per cent but has no 
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significant influence on giving to beggars. In contrast, a one unit increase in the membership of 
informal insurance groups increases the probability of giving to both charities and beggars by 4 
per cent. Interestingly, a one unit increase in the membership of interest/political groups reduces 
(increases) the probability of giving to charities (beggars) by 7 per cent.  Conceivably, audience 
effects (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009) in the beggar context (verbal ask, non-anonymous) 
enhance the giving behaviours of political individuals as this boosts their social image. 
Table 2 Probit estimation for charitable giving in South Africa (2003).  
 
Dependent variable: Cash/in-kind donations 
 Formal charities Beggars 
 ME SE ME SE 
Personal/household characteristics     
Female -0.001 (0.020) 0.009 (0.021) 
Racea     
Black -0.07* (0.038) -0.040 (0.039) 
Asian 0.053 (0.066) 0.268**** (0.037) 
Mixed race -0.074 (0.049) 0.092** (0.043) 
Age 0.002*** (0.001) -0.001** (0.001) 
Educationb     
Grade 1-7 0.064* (0.037) 0.007 (0.037) 
Grade 8-12 0.022 (0.039) -0.002 (0.038) 
Post-secondary 0.098** (0.046) 0.034 (0.050) 
College 0.212**** (0.043) 0.025 (0.065) 
Religionc     
Catholic 0.320**** (0.020) -0.131*** (0.047) 
Other Christians 0.334**** (0.034) -0.064** (0.032) 
Other religion 0.256**** (0.028) -0.056 (0.054) 
Wealth index 0.057**** (0.015) 0.022 (0.015) 
Household size -0.009 (0.007) 0.009 (0.007) 
Children < 18 0.027*** (0.010) -0.012 (0.010) 
Social capital     
Community group  0.052**** (0.013) 0.016 (0.013) 
Interest group -0.067**** (0.019) 0.077**** (0.020) 
Informal insurance group 0.042*** (0.016) 0.039** (0.016) 
Motives     
WARMGLOWe: agree 0.090** (0.036) 0.055 (0.036) 
WARMGLOW: neutral 0.074* (0.044) 0.014 (0.047) 
INEQUALf: agree 0.057** (0.025) -0.015 (0.027) 
INEQUAL: neutral 0.060** (0.029) -0.082*** (0.032) 
Region dummies Yes  Yes  
N 2937  2937  
pseudo R2 0.129  0.117  
Goodness of fit 0.434  0.212  
Log likelihood -1672.599  -1707.316  
Prob > chi2 0.000  0.000  
LR chi2(35) 493.76  452.13  
Cronbach’s alpha, wealth index  0.739  0.739  
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ME are marginal effects; SE is standard error, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. Referent 
categories: a is white, b is no education, c is atheists, e is disagree, f is disagree. Dwelling type dummies also 
included, but not shown here.  
 
 
Consistent with previous literature, demographics and socioeconomic variables such as age, 
higher education, religious affiliation, wealth, and having young children positively influence 
giving to formal charities (Bekker and Wiepking, 2011; Wiepking and Bekkers, 2012).  
However, these factors have negative or insignificant effects on giving to beggars. Christians are 
particularly less likely to give to beggars compared to atheists.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Giving behaviours in South Africa have implications on how domestic resources are and can be 
mobilized for charity and poverty alleviation (Everatt et al., 2005). This study’s results broadly 
indicate that “who gives and why” varies by “when and to whom”, consistent with the emerging 
assertion in literature that giving is contextual (Andreoni et al., 2011). As this study used cross 
sectional data, further survey and experimental research is however needed to provide deeper 
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